

Living with Hegemony: High and low crisis periods and perceptions of the U.S. in global public opinion

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Abstract

This paper examines the relevance of three models developed in our previous work with Takashi Inoguchi for explaining patterns of global opinion towards U.S. foreign policy. Here we look at situations of varying levels of international crisis involving the U.S. We use survey data including a number of questions which have been asked repeatedly in many countries by several survey organizations, Globescan/PIPA, Gallup International, and PEW, since 2001. The goals are to (1) establish whether consistent patterns exist in global perceptions of the U.S., and (2) explore the reasons for consistencies with and deviations from these patterns during 'normal' and crisis periods. In effect, we ask what are the normal bounds within which U.S. foreign policy operates relative to global opinion, and how those bounds might expand or contract. Our conclusions include new support for the negative impact of U.S. unilateralism on perceptions of U.S. foreign policy.

Policy makers and analysts have recognized the importance of global public opinion for the success or failure of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Joseph Nye (2004: 105) has argued that "When the United States sought support for the Iraq war..., the [current Bush] administration's squandering of... soft power created a disabling rather than enabling environment for its policies." Even such a strong advocate and architect of U.S. policy as U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently acknowledged that the U.S. had failed to communicate its message effectively to important foreign audiences.¹

But this failure was not for lack of effort. Neither policy makers, with all the resources they command, nor academics and analysts, can identify with any certainty the factors which affect global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy. The answer to this question is very relevant for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and, we argue, contributes significantly to our understanding of foreign policy and international relations. This paper builds on our previous work (Goldsmith 2006; Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Inoguchi 2005; Horiuchi, Goldsmith and Inoguchi 2005) by testing the general applicability, across higher and lower crisis periods in the years 2001-2005, of three models for understanding global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

In recent decades, scholars have studied the relationship between public opinion in a given country and that same country's foreign policy. Many recognize the effect of domestic public opinion on U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Holsti 1992, 1996; Risse-Kappen 1991), and that domestic public opinion on U.S. foreign policy responds in "rational" and "prudent" ways to events and new information (e.g., Jentleson 1992, Isernia, Juhasz and Rattinger 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992). Using data from Western Europe and Russia, other studies also point to similar stability and rationality of domestic public opinion about foreign policy in these countries (e.g.,

¹ Accessed online at BBC.co.uk, 15 June 2005, He raised the grade to "D or D+" in 2006 (accessed online at NYtimes.com, 27 March 2006).

Eichenberg 1989; Zimmerman 2002). We argue that the “rational public” and “prudent public” frameworks can be extended to the relationship between one country’s foreign policy and public opinion in another country. More specifically, we are interested in understanding the regularities and influences on non-U.S. public opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

Three Models: Interests, Socialization, and Influence

Drawing out the implications of some existing theories of foreign policy and international relations, we have developed the following models. (1) State-level interests shape public opinion with regard to U.S. foreign policy (Interest Model); (2) Political culture and historical experience shape public opinion with regard to U.S. foreign policy (Socialization Model); (3) U.S. pressure shapes public opinion about U.S. foreign policy (Influence Model).

These models are based broadly on a range of existing general theory, although there is no previous theorizing which addresses the specific issues of interest directly. Realist theory, for example, assumes either the irrelevance of public opinion for foreign policy, or the ease of elite manipulation of public opinion which would make it congruent with “national interests” set by elites (e.g., Mearsheimer 1990). This forms the core of our Interest model. Theories of learning (Khong 1992; Reiter 1996) and historical context in foreign policy (Deutsch 1968) emphasize the key role of formative events, vivid national experiences, and specific historical processes in shaping mass public perceptions regarding foreign policy. This is the foundation for our Socialization model. And ideas focused on agenda setting and transnational persuasion in theoretical concepts of “complex interdependence” and “soft power” (Keohane and Nye 2000; Nye 2004), and also frameworks such as “second-image reversed” (Gourevitch 1978) and “two-level games” (Putnam 1988), provide the basis for our Influence model.

We discuss these models in more detail in Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi (2005). For our purposes here, we will only discuss the specific factors to be examined in the empirical analysis and how they relate to the models.

Interests

One indicator of state-level security interests is alliances such as mutual defense pacts. Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) “S” statistic measures the congruence of alliance portfolios for a pair of states. We use “S” between the United States and each state in our data ($S_{w/U.S.}$) to measure alliance ties with the U.S. A positive coefficient in the analysis below would indicate that public opinion is consistent with the interests reflected in alliance ties. A negative coefficient, which has emerged in our previous work (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005; Goldsmith 2006), would however indicate a backlash effect. If this is based on negative perceptions of previous security cooperation with the United States (e.g., Japan’s difficulties hosting U.S. bases), the effect might best be described as “socialized” rather than based on state-level security interests.

We also include an indicator for the most robust and institutionalized of alliances involving the U.S.: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is a dummy variable coded “1” for each country which is a member of the alliance in the year of the survey, and “0” otherwise. A positive coefficient would indicate that populations in NATO countries tend to be more favorable towards U.S. foreign policy – based on a recognition of mutual interests, we argue. Our previous research has indeed supported this expectation.

In order to measure economic interests tied to the U.S. we use an indicator of trade dependence, Total Trade with the U.S. divided by Gross Domestic Product for each country ($[\text{Imports} + \text{Exports}]/\text{GDP}$; variable name “Trade / GDP”). This tracks the relative weight of trade with the United States for the economic welfare of each country. A positive coefficient would indicate that public opinion in countries with greater trade dependence on the U.S. also tends to view U.S. foreign policy behavior more favorably. Again, we argue that this is due at least in part to awareness of mutual interests. However, we do also note that a positive effect might be partially due to greater levels of interaction and familiarity with the U.S. – a “socialized” effect. We believe that any socialized effect would be secondary to cognizance of mutual interests, and that the socialized values might in any case simply be greater awareness of shared interests. Some evidence for this effect has surfaced in previous research, although the effect was not very robust.²

Socialization

We use an indicator of Regime Type to gauge whether countries with more democratic systems exhibit more popular approval for the foreign policy of another democracy. Normative versions of democratic peace theory can be interpreted to imply a more positive perception of other democracies among mass publics in democracies. The latest data from the Polity project are used, ranging from -10 for fully authoritarian regimes to +10 for fully democratic regimes (Marshall and Gurr 2001). This is also an important control to include because we want to assess the independent effect of press freedom under our Influence model. Our previous work has found little or no support for this proposition, but we include it here because a wider range of conflict situations and questions is covered.

The percentage of the population which is Muslim (% Muslim) is an important socialization variable to include because all of the data are in the post-September 2001 context. The United States is involved in a “war on terror” which is primarily targeted at extreme fundamentalist groups professing to act in the name of Islam. Muslims around the world may be socialized in this context to be less supportive, or more ambivalent, about U.S. policies than other groups. We use data from the “factbook.net” website which are more up-to-date than those used in our previous studies (http://www.factbook.net/muslim_pop.php, accessed June 2006).

One factor which we have not included in our previous work is a belief in the efficacy of multilateral institutions and international law. We propose that populations of states belonging to a large number of international organizations will be more likely to see the rules and institutions of international relations as sources of legitimate foreign policy guidelines. Much U.S. behavior in the “war on terror” has been seen as unilateral and has not received the sanction of international organizations such as the United Nations. This is especially true for the War in Iraq, launched without the approval of the U.N. Security Council, and subsequent policies such as the detention of so-called “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, outside of the rules of the Geneva Convention. As an indicator of belief in international organizations and law as restraints on U.S. foreign policy we use the number of joint memberships in IGOs shared by a given country and the United States (IGOs w/U.S.). Data are from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2003). The greater the number of

² We thank a reviewer for pointing out that the connections between socialization and interest present intriguing areas for future research.

joint memberships, we hypothesize, the lower support for U.S. foreign policy, especially during and after the 2003 Iraq war.

Another factor which has proven significant in our previous work is recent experience with terrorist attacks in the survey country. Here we use data from the ITERATE dataset (Mickolus et al. 2004) to indicate whether a country experienced at least one fatal terror incident in the year prior to the survey (TerrFatal).

The final two socialization variables control for the exceptional experiences of two countries. Our previous work has indicated that both Albania and Israel are outliers which must be accounted for to avoid biased results. Albania's exceptional experience regarding U.S. foreign policy stems from the U.S. war with the former Yugoslavia in defense of Kosovar Albanians. Israel's exceptional experience is perhaps more self-evident – decades of strong U.S. diplomatic and military aid in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both states exhibit exceptionally high levels of support for U.S. foreign policy in previous analyses. We use dummy variables to control for the effects of each country when it is included in our survey data.

Influence

Our sole measure of U.S. influence in this paper is an indirect one: Press freedom. This does not measure attempts to influence public opinion directly, but rather represents the ability of the U.S. message to reach a given population through mass media. We assume that U.S. leaders' attempts to "spin" interpretation of events will have some positive effect on opinion, if it is allowed to reach people. If it is filtered, or blocked altogether, then the effect will be minimized or even reversed. We use Freedom House data from their Annual Survey of Press Freedom, 2002-2005 (freedomhouse.org). We note that this is a conservative measure of the impact of the U.S. message because 1) not all state-censored media will necessarily add an anti-U.S. bias (e.g., Pakistan), and 2) not all U.S. messages are likely to have a positive effect on opinion in all countries (backlash seems plausible in many instances).

These factors, operationalized from our three models, form the independent variables for our study. In the next section we discuss the survey data used for the dependent variables as well as our econometric methods.

Data and Methods

In recent years there has been an expansion of multinational survey research (Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005). Some of the more recent research has clear relevance to foreign policy and international relations. For the dependent variables in our study we use answers to several survey questions asked in large-scale multinational surveys by three organizations: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (PEW), Gallup International, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes with Globescan (Globescan/PIPA).

Since we are comparing several surveys, with different samples of states, conducted at different times, we have attempted to identify similar questions from the surveys for analysis to enhance our ability to generalize. For the same reason we have focused on questions asking for general assessments of U.S. foreign policy, rather than dealing with specific events. There are two types of questions included in the analysis: 1) those which assess the effect of U.S. foreign policy on the survey respondent's country, and 2) those which assess the respondent's overall view of U.S. foreign policy. These clearly may elicit different responses, so we attempt to keep them distinct in the analysis. But we also attach importance to effects which are robust enough to emerge in both sets of questions.

The tables list the specific questions, survey dates, and the relevant survey organizations. The surveys used are as follows. From Gallup we use the End of Year Terrorism Poll (2001), the Voice of the People survey (2002), the Iraq Poll and the Post-War Iraq Poll (2003). From PEW we use the Global Attitudes Survey (2002). From Globescan/PIPA we use the 19-Nation Poll on Global Issues (2004), and the BBC World Service Poll (2005). These surveys and questions are chosen from a larger dataset of multinational surveys assembled by Goldsmith (www.newcastle.edu.au/school/ept/research/goldsmith/index.html). All general questions relating to U.S. foreign policy with a sample size sufficient for meaningful results were used.

Our analysis uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Our key methodological choice is to study each possible response to each question as a separate dependent variable. We do this because of the non-random nature of “don’t know” and “refused” responses cross-nationally. There appear to be substantial systematic differences in these responses, indicating that they have substantive meaning and also that these differences must be considered when interpreting the results for positive and negative responses to the same questions. We discuss this issue further in Horiuchi, Goldsmith, and Inoguchi (2005). Results are presented for all responses to ten survey questions asked in the period 2001-2005. The tables come under the relevant year heading and show the coefficient, standard error (in italics), and the P-value for each variable. For ease of comparison variables with 90 percent or higher significance are indicated with bold font as well. In our discussion of results we rely on several “war-on-terror” timelines to accurately trace events (BBC; PBS; U.S. House of Representatives).

Results

2001

Our results for 2001 are from a poll conducted during and immediately after the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. While our previous studies have focused on explicit support or opposition to this war (and the 2003 war with Iraq), here we are interested in general assessments of U.S. foreign policy. Among the relevant questions asked over the 5-year period, the question asked by Gallup in 2001 has to do with the effect of U.S. foreign policy on the respondent’s own country (the first type of question noted in the previous section). In spite of the different questions used, some strong similarities emerge with results in previous work on this period.

The significant positive effects of NATO membership and the Albanian and Israeli variables are consistent with previous work. Recent experience with terrorism is also very nearly significant in its positive effect; in previous work the significance level was somewhat higher, but the effect is consistent. Among the factors leading to stronger negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy, the backlash effect of alliance ties with the U.S. is consistent with our previous work. This is also true for the significant reduction of negative views based on NATO membership (and for Albania). The direction of the effects of Muslim population on positive and negative assessments is consistent with our previous work, but here these effects do not reach statistical significance.

However, the reduction in positive responses associated with joint international organization memberships with the United States and the tendency of both democracy and press freedom to lead to more negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy is a new and interesting finding. We will return to interpretation of

these factors in the concluding section of the paper. Here we note that it appears that “unilateral” U.S. foreign policy, even before the 2003 Iraq war, was perceived with disapproval among populations which placed more faith in international organizations and law, were used to democratic governance in their own states, and had less biased information about U.S. policies. Criticisms of U.S. unilateralism were more prominent in subsequent years, but President Bush’s statement that “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” in a major 20 September 2001 speech indicates the unilateral direction of U.S. policy then as well (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>).

Date: 8 November - 29 December 2001 (Gallup)

Question: Some say American foreign policy has contributed to the terrorism against the United States. Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <your country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <your country>?

	Positive Effect	<i>P</i>	Negative Effect	<i>P</i>	No Effect	<i>P</i>	DK	<i>P</i>
Regime Type	-0.070 <i>0.943</i>	0.941	2.048 <i>0.991</i>	0.046	-1.447 <i>0.737</i>	0.057	-0.538 <i>0.826</i>	0.519
TerrFatal	10.285 <i>6.110</i>	0.101	-3.557 <i>6.422</i>	0.583	-0.676 <i>4.775</i>	0.888	-6.025 <i>5.352</i>	0.268
Press freedom	-0.093 <i>0.163</i>	0.573	0.386 <i>0.172</i>	0.031	-0.364 <i>0.128</i>	0.007	0.070 <i>0.143</i>	0.625
% Muslim	-1.348 <i>13.269</i>	0.920	18.917 <i>13.946</i>	0.183	3.923 <i>10.370</i>	0.707	-21.501 <i>11.623</i>	0.072
S w/U.S.	1.210 <i>12.831</i>	0.925	47.606 <i>13.486</i>	0.001	-0.460 <i>10.027</i>	0.964	-48.305 <i>11.239</i>	0.000
NATO	9.873 <i>5.013</i>	0.056	-13.854 <i>5.269</i>	0.012	-1.607 <i>3.917</i>	0.684	5.547 <i>4.391</i>	0.214
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.390 <i>0.211</i>	0.073	0.209 <i>0.222</i>	0.352	0.242 <i>0.165</i>	0.151	-0.060 <i>0.185</i>	0.746
Trade / GDP	27.515 <i>27.992</i>	0.332	-12.811 <i>29.420</i>	0.666	-6.274 <i>21.875</i>	0.776	-8.300 <i>24.519</i>	0.737
Albania	40.067 <i>13.855</i>	0.006	-43.456 <i>14.562</i>	0.005	2.779 <i>10.827</i>	0.799	0.650 <i>12.136</i>	0.958
Israel	33.760 <i>13.032</i>	0.014	-16.534 <i>13.697</i>	0.235	-9.990 <i>10.184</i>	0.333	-7.248 <i>11.416</i>	0.529
constant	39.684 <i>15.949</i>	0.017	-23.939 <i>16.762</i>	0.162	30.712 <i>12.463</i>	0.019	53.558 <i>13.970</i>	0.000
N	48		48		48		48	
R ²	0.5050		0.5159		0.3410		0.4449	
Prob > F	0.0014		0.0010		0.0713		0.0077	

More difficult to interpret are results for the “no effect” and “don’t know” categories. Higher levels of democracy and of press freedom lead to fewer respondents believing that U.S. foreign policy has no effect on their country. This may reflect, in the first instance, a sense among publics in democracies that their fates are tied with that of the United States, and in the second instance a greater awareness of the actual impact of U.S. behavior on all states, including their own, in the post-Cold War world.

Both Muslim population and non-NATO allies of the U.S. tend to have fewer “don’t know” responses. This lack of ambiguity would seem to be associated with a greater tendency to see the U.S. as a negative factor for one’s own country (although this effect is not significant for the Muslim population variable).

2002

We have five relevant survey questions for 2002: two which ask about U.S. foreign policy towards respondents’ countries and three which ask for general evaluations of U.S. foreign policy. In this section and for the remainder of the paper, will provide a selective discussion of results which seem especially important rather than describing the results for each variable in each question.

The questions specific to the respondent’s country include one with similar wording to that in 2001, also from a Gallup survey, and another from a PEW survey asking how much the respondent feels the U.S. considers the interests of countries like his/her’s. Our model appears to provide a better explanation for responses to the former than the latter question, judging by the proportion of significant factors and the R^2 statistics (we recognize that comparing R^2 statistics across models and datasets is only a crude indicator of relative explanatory power).

The most robust result across the two questions is the effect of joint international organization membership with the United States. Consistent with the 2001 data, this variable reduces the positive assessments of the effect of U.S. foreign policy. In the PEW question it also increases the responses indicating that the U.S. does not consider the interests of countries like the respondent’s country at all. Clearly this factor, which has not been included in our previous work, has important effect on global opinion. We interpret it as indicating a preference for U.S. foreign policy which conforms to international law and operates through multilateral organizations. Thus we see it as an indicator of disapproval of U.S. unilateralism in the “war on terror” (although a more direct measure of such views would be useful as well).

Another result which stands out is the significant positive effect of non-NATO alliance ties (“S”) with the United States in the 2002 Gallup question. This is consistent with our Interests model and contradicts previous results indicating a backlash. Given the specific focus of the question on the effects of U.S. policy on the respondent’s country and the recency of the 2001 Afghan war, it would seem plausible to interpret this very much in line with our Interests model: respondents are aware that it is better to be “with” the U.S. than “with the terrorists”, regardless of their other views about U.S. foreign policy. Indeed this is the only instance of such an effect in all the questions we examine here. As such it may be interpreted as recognition in international public opinion of the utility of joining with, or at least not resisting, U.S. policies in it’s “war on terror.” However, the failure of this effect to re-emerge among non-NATO U.S. allies in similar questions asked in 2003 may also indicate that the costs and risks of joining with the U.S. become more salient over time.

Another result of interest is the positive effect of trade relations with the U.S. This effect is positive in all results for 2002, and significant in three of the five questions. It has a significant effect on the assessments of the impact of U.S. foreign policy on respondents’ countries (Gallup) and it is also significant in two general assessment questions. These questions deal with the overall role of the U.S. in the world (PEW) and with American ideas about democracy (PEW). Although this effect is only significant in 2002 data, it is positive in all but one of the analyses for the

entire period examined here (it is negative and insignificant in the one questioned examined for 2004). Thus, this provides further support for our Interests model.

Dates: 25 June - 8 September 2002 (Gallup)

Question: Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <this country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <this country>?

	Positive Effect	P>t	Negative Effect	P>t	No Effect	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	0.980 <i>0.701</i>	0.172	1.702 <i>0.929</i>	0.077	-0.684 <i>0.575</i>	0.244	0.414 <i>0.595</i>	0.491
TerrFatal	10.943 <i>6.073</i>	0.082	-6.877 <i>8.046</i>	0.399	-0.313 <i>4.985</i>	0.950	1.330 <i>5.151</i>	0.798
Press freedom	0.022 <i>0.157</i>	0.889	-0.040 <i>0.208</i>	0.848	-0.284 <i>0.129</i>	0.036	-0.028 <i>0.133</i>	0.835
% Muslim	-8.088 <i>8.369</i>	0.342	35.078 <i>11.087</i>	0.004	6.893 <i>6.869</i>	0.324	-3.824 <i>7.098</i>	0.594
S w/U.S.	31.975 <i>12.786</i>	0.018	17.730 <i>16.940</i>	0.304	-9.385 <i>10.495</i>	0.378	-20.744 <i>10.845</i>	0.065
NATO	4.045 <i>5.560</i>	0.473	-10.582 <i>7.366</i>	0.161	-6.200 <i>4.564</i>	0.184	8.179 <i>4.716</i>	0.093
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.977 <i>0.235</i>	0.000	0.474 <i>0.311</i>	0.139	0.251 <i>0.193</i>	0.203	-0.163 <i>0.199</i>	0.420
Trade / GDP	40.858 <i>21.488</i>	0.067	-23.198 <i>28.468</i>	0.422	-14.109 <i>17.638</i>	0.430	-9.437 <i>18.226</i>	0.608
constant	46.139 <i>16.066</i>	0.007	-4.805 <i>21.284</i>	0.823	24.820 <i>13.187</i>	0.070	31.250 <i>13.627</i>	0.029
N	39		39		39		39	
R ²	0.5491		0.3234		0.2956		0.2432	
Prob > F	0.0010		0.1180		0.1747		0.3295	

Dates: 2 July - 31 October 2002 (PEW)

Question: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of The United States

	Very Favorable	P>t	Somewhat Favorable	P>t	Somewhat Unfavorable	P>t	Very Unfavorable	P>t	DK	P>t	Refused	P>t
Regime Type	0.722	0.330	2.312	0.000	0.365	0.485	-1.680	0.012	-0.345	0.225	-0.027	0.817
	<i>0.728</i>		<i>0.534</i>		<i>0.515</i>		<i>0.626</i>		<i>0.278</i>		<i>0.116</i>	
TerrFatal	2.946	0.585	4.261	0.285	-1.244	0.744	-0.747	0.872	-1.619	0.433	-0.745	0.387
	<i>5.326</i>		<i>3.910</i>		<i>3.770</i>		<i>4.586</i>		<i>2.037</i>		<i>0.848</i>	
Press freedom	-0.094	0.596	0.092	0.481	0.007	0.954	-0.167	0.279	-0.023	0.738	0.039	0.171
	<i>0.175</i>		<i>0.129</i>		<i>0.124</i>		<i>0.151</i>		<i>0.067</i>		<i>0.028</i>	
% Muslim	-5.480	0.521	-11.631	0.070	3.436	0.569	27.338	0.001	4.276	0.195	0.306	0.821
	<i>8.422</i>		<i>6.184</i>		<i>5.962</i>		<i>7.252</i>		<i>3.221</i>		<i>1.341</i>	
S w/U.S.	-6.322	0.717	-6.255	0.626	5.895	0.634	20.285	0.184	12.625	0.066	-0.526	0.850
	<i>17.280</i>		<i>12.687</i>		<i>12.232</i>		<i>14.879</i>		<i>6.608</i>		<i>2.751</i>	
NATO	-0.886	0.906	17.634	0.003	-2.058	0.699	-5.970	0.360	-3.044	0.294	0.330	0.783
	<i>7.450</i>		<i>5.470</i>		<i>5.274</i>		<i>6.415</i>		<i>2.849</i>		<i>1.186</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.727	0.006	-0.608	0.002	0.156	0.377	0.420	0.057	0.072	0.451	-0.005	0.907
	<i>0.246</i>		<i>0.180</i>		<i>0.174</i>		<i>0.212</i>		<i>0.094</i>		<i>0.039</i>	
Trade / GDP	56.146	0.034	-5.699	0.760	-22.180	0.223	-22.018	0.318	-6.954	0.476	8.173	0.051
	<i>25.170</i>		<i>18.480</i>		<i>17.817</i>		<i>21.673</i>		<i>9.626</i>		<i>4.008</i>	
constant	55.594	0.001	55.410	0.000	4.709	0.674	-7.405	0.587	-0.070	0.991	-0.495	0.844
	<i>15.664</i>		<i>11.501</i>		<i>11.088</i>		<i>13.488</i>		<i>5.990</i>		<i>2.494</i>	
N	37		37		37		37		37		37	
R ²	0.3711		0.6821		0.1559		0.5595		0.1979		0.3347	
Prob > F	0.0746		0.0000		0.7324		0.0014		0.5579		0.1280	

Dates: 2 July - 31 October 2002 (PEW)

Question: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at

	Great Deal	P>t	Fair Amount	P>t	Not Too Much	P>t	Not At All	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	-0.081	0.895	0.963	0.067	1.422	0.031	0.000	1.000	-0.907	0.011
	<i>0.605</i>		<i>0.506</i>		<i>0.627</i>		<i>0.636</i>		<i>0.332</i>	
TerrFatal	-1.350	0.763	6.206	0.105	1.230	0.791	-4.646	0.327	2.119	0.390
	<i>4.428</i>		<i>3.704</i>		<i>4.591</i>		<i>4.654</i>		<i>2.428</i>	
Press freedom	-0.027	0.854	0.027	0.824	0.014	0.927	0.045	0.770	-0.208	0.015
	<i>0.146</i>		<i>0.122</i>		<i>0.151</i>		<i>0.153</i>		<i>0.080</i>	
% Muslim	1.227	0.862	-2.588	0.662	-1.144	0.876	16.730	0.031	2.669	0.493
	<i>7.001</i>		<i>5.857</i>		<i>7.259</i>		<i>7.360</i>		<i>3.839</i>	
S w/U.S.	13.226	0.365	14.292	0.244	-21.539	0.159	15.245	0.321	3.987	0.617
	<i>14.365</i>		<i>12.017</i>		<i>14.894</i>		<i>15.100</i>		<i>7.877</i>	
NATO	-2.480	0.692	0.875	0.867	12.925	0.054	-2.374	0.718	-2.779	0.420
	<i>6.194</i>		<i>5.181</i>		<i>6.422</i>		<i>6.510</i>		<i>3.396</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.541	0.013	-0.621	0.001	0.074	0.730	0.426	0.057	-0.052	0.647
	<i>0.204</i>		<i>0.171</i>		<i>0.212</i>		<i>0.215</i>		<i>0.112</i>	
Trade / GDP	18.336	0.388	17.398	0.329	5.573	0.799	-26.316	0.242	-6.966	0.549
	<i>20.925</i>		<i>17.504</i>		<i>21.695</i>		<i>21.995</i>		<i>11.473</i>	
constant	32.451	0.019	40.319	0.001	26.937	0.056	-12.683	0.362	21.508	0.005
	<i>13.022</i>		<i>10.893</i>		<i>13.502</i>		<i>13.688</i>		<i>7.140</i>	
N	37		37		37		37		37	
R ²	0.3242		0.4120		0.4717		0.2662		0.3828	
Prob > F	0.2478		0.0377		0.0119		0.2982		0.0619	

Dates: 2 July - 31 October 2002 (PEW)

Question: And which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.

	Like	P>t	Dislike	P>t	DK	P>t	Refused	P>t
Regime Type	2.542	0.022	0.357	0.664	0.054	0.891	-0.018	0.705
	<i>1.045</i>		<i>0.815</i>		<i>0.393</i>		<i>0.047</i>	
TerrFatal	5.284	0.496	8.037	0.189	3.170	0.280	-0.012	0.972
	<i>7.653</i>		<i>5.963</i>		<i>2.879</i>		<i>0.346</i>	
Press freedom	-0.177	0.487	-0.205	0.306	-0.091	0.343	-0.004	0.699
	<i>0.252</i>		<i>0.196</i>		<i>0.095</i>		<i>0.011</i>	
% Muslim	0.333	0.978	18.152	0.064	-2.379	0.605	0.088	0.873
	<i>12.102</i>		<i>9.430</i>		<i>4.553</i>		<i>0.547</i>	
S w/U.S.	-30.841	0.224	43.411	0.033	5.077	0.591	0.436	0.700
	<i>24.829</i>		<i>19.347</i>		<i>9.341</i>		<i>1.122</i>	
NATO	4.493	0.678	-2.591	0.758	-2.971	0.467	0.058	0.905
	<i>10.705</i>		<i>8.342</i>		<i>4.028</i>		<i>0.484</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.913	0.015	0.102	0.714	0.030	0.825	-0.003	0.873
	<i>0.353</i>		<i>0.275</i>		<i>0.133</i>		<i>0.016</i>	
Trade / GDP	71.087	0.059	-19.405	0.497	-10.359	0.453	2.850	0.092
	<i>36.167</i>		<i>28.182</i>		<i>13.607</i>		<i>1.634</i>	
constant	93.669	0.000	6.515	0.713	11.202	0.197	0.691	0.503
	<i>22.508</i>		<i>17.539</i>		<i>8.468</i>		<i>1.017</i>	
N	37		37		37		37	
R ²	0.4536		0.4017		0.2088		0.1636	
Prob > F	0.0172		0.0451		0.5124		0.7011	

Dates: 2 July - 31 October 2002 (PEW)

Question: And which comes closer to describing your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism.

	Favor	P>t	Oppose	P>t	DK	P>t	Refused	P>t
Regime Type	3.113	0.003	-1.050	0.301	-0.629	0.054	-0.087	0.185
	<i>0.958</i>		<i>0.997</i>		<i>0.313</i>		<i>0.064</i>	
TerrFatal	14.799	0.044	-10.202	0.173	-1.058	0.648	-0.687	0.154
	<i>7.014</i>		<i>7.298</i>		<i>2.293</i>		<i>0.468</i>	
Press freedom	0.245	0.297	-0.228	0.351	-0.173	0.029	0.011	0.470
	<i>0.231</i>		<i>0.240</i>		<i>0.075</i>		<i>0.015</i>	
% Muslim	-32.817	0.006	44.690	0.001	4.971	0.181	1.402	0.069
	<i>11.091</i>		<i>11.541</i>		<i>3.626</i>		<i>0.740</i>	
S w/U.S.	-2.735	0.905	24.484	0.310	3.437	0.648	0.516	0.737
	<i>22.755</i>		<i>23.678</i>		<i>7.440</i>		<i>1.519</i>	
NATO	24.525	0.019	-16.170	0.124	-2.413	0.458	0.064	0.923
	<i>9.811</i>		<i>10.209</i>		<i>3.208</i>		<i>0.655</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-1.384	0.000	0.577	0.097	0.082	0.446	0.033	0.142
	<i>0.324</i>		<i>0.337</i>		<i>0.106</i>		<i>0.022</i>	
Trade / GDP	41.294	0.223	-24.112	0.490	-10.969	0.320	1.256	0.575
	<i>33.146</i>		<i>34.491</i>		<i>10.838</i>		<i>2.213</i>	
constant	95.358	0.000	1.657	0.939	11.880	0.089	-1.152	0.410
	<i>20.628</i>		<i>21.465</i>		<i>6.745</i>		<i>1.377</i>	
N	37		37		37		37	
R ²	0.6157		0.4464		0.2718		0.3714	
Prob > F	0.0003		0.0198		0.2807		0.0742	

Continuing with the three questions focused on general evaluations of U.S. foreign policy in 2002, what again stands out is the consistent effect of IGO membership. Citizens of states with more joint IGO memberships with the United States consistently and significantly exhibit less positive and more negative views of the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy in 2002. This is true across the three questions which evaluate the overall opinion of the United States, American ideas about democracy, and the “U.S.-led War on Terror.”

We also note that our models seem to fit the general survey responses especially well. This is true for the question regarding overall favorable or unfavorable “opinion of the United States” (PEW) as well as the question regarding the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism (PEW). Our R² statistics reach above .6 for some responses, and almost all variables achieve significant effects for at least one response.

The year 2002 was a relatively low-conflict year in the “war on terror.” The early part of 2003 was also relatively peaceful, although diplomatic activity intensified as the issue of Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction programs was highlighted by the U.S.

2003

The data for 2003 include the same question asked both before and after the March 19 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This question, dealing with the effect of U.S. policy on the respondent’s country, was also asked in 2001 (with different wording) and 2002, each time by Gallup. Thus responses in each period may be compared with reference to the particular international context.

Two things seem clear from such comparisons. First, the robust effect of joint IGO membership persists. This reinforces our interpretation that this is an indicator of opposition to U.S. unilateralism. As the U.S. flouted the reservations and preferences of most other members of the U.N. Security Council and moved towards war with Iraq, other issues such as fighting terrorism or appealing to allies’ interests seemed to be overshadowed by the perception of the U.S.’s impatient and unilateral rush to war.

The second thing which seems clear from the comparison is that as the war with Iraq approaches, our models overall seem less and less relevant to understanding how people around the world perceive the effect of U.S. behavior on their country. This is so because other variables lose statistical significance in 2003, including Regime Type, Terrorism, Muslim population, Alliance ties, and NATO membership. However, we also note that our equations retain fairly high overall explanatory power in 2003, with R² statistics above .4 and .5 for the key “positive” and “negative” responses, quite comparable to 2001 and 2002. Thus, our interpretation that opinion becomes focused on the issue of U.S. unilateralism seems to be supported, rather than the interpretation that our models are actually not relevant in higher conflict circumstances.

This supports our Socialization model in particular: socialized values of multilateral cooperation and respect for international law appear to be strong factors guiding global opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

Dates: 11-29 January 2003 (Gallup)

Question: Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <your country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <your country>?

	Positive	P>t	Negative	P>t	No Effect	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	0.734	0.488	-0.182	0.831	-0.565	0.261	0.022	0.974
	<i>1.041</i>		<i>0.840</i>		<i>0.490</i>		<i>0.662</i>	
TerrFatal	1.538	0.801	5.488	0.270	-3.185	0.272	-4.103	0.295
	<i>6.016</i>		<i>4.851</i>		<i>2.829</i>		<i>3.826</i>	
Press freedom	0.150	0.342	-0.269	0.042	0.072	0.334	0.050	0.619
	<i>0.155</i>		<i>0.125</i>		<i>0.073</i>		<i>0.098</i>	
% Muslim	-13.994	0.442	5.673	0.698	0.714	0.933	7.609	0.510
	<i>17.864</i>		<i>14.406</i>		<i>8.402</i>		<i>11.361</i>	
S w/U.S.	-10.394	0.561	16.575	0.256	-6.465	0.444	0.101	0.993
	<i>17.625</i>		<i>14.214</i>		<i>8.289</i>		<i>11.209</i>	
NATO	2.512	0.735	-3.751	0.532	-1.942	0.578	2.818	0.551
	<i>7.322</i>		<i>5.905</i>		<i>3.444</i>		<i>4.657</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.646	0.052	0.396	0.132	0.075	0.618	0.189	0.354
	<i>0.314</i>		<i>0.253</i>		<i>0.148</i>		<i>0.200</i>	
Trade / GDP	31.202	0.280	-25.009	0.283	-9.023	0.503	2.494	0.891
	<i>28.195</i>		<i>22.737</i>		<i>13.260</i>		<i>17.931</i>	
Albania	50.657	0.006	-36.191	0.013	-13.789	0.092	-1.631	0.879
	<i>16.618</i>		<i>13.402</i>		<i>7.816</i>		<i>10.569</i>	
constant	50.433	0.012	27.663	0.076	19.359	0.036	1.962	0.868
	<i>18.396</i>		<i>14.835</i>		<i>8.652</i>		<i>11.699</i>	
N	32		32		32		32	
R ²	0.5939		0.6525		0.4858		0.1942	
Prob > F	0.0071		0.0017		0.0528		0.7920	

Dates: 14 April - 8 May 2003 (Gallup)

Question: Generally, do you think American foreign policy has a positive effect on <your country>, a negative effect or does American foreign policy have no effect on <your country>?

	Positive	P>t	Negative	P>t	No Effect	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	0.951	0.297	-0.787	0.365	-0.231	0.749	0.066	0.877
	<i>0.893</i>		<i>0.854</i>		<i>0.716</i>		<i>0.421</i>	
TerrFatal	7.600	0.225	-1.668	0.778	-5.655	0.259	-0.419	0.885
	<i>6.114</i>		<i>5.845</i>		<i>4.902</i>		<i>2.884</i>	
Press freedom	-0.050	0.769	0.189	0.254	-0.018	0.894	-0.126	0.127
	<i>0.169</i>		<i>0.162</i>		<i>0.136</i>		<i>0.080</i>	
% Muslim	8.914	0.557	-12.311	0.398	-2.509	0.836	6.139	0.393
	<i>14.977</i>		<i>14.316</i>		<i>12.007</i>		<i>7.064</i>	
S w/U.S.	4.897	0.816	20.581	0.310	-23.143	0.177	-1.766	0.858
	<i>20.794</i>		<i>19.877</i>		<i>16.671</i>		<i>9.807</i>	
NATO	8.460	0.236	-5.295	0.434	-3.768	0.506	0.560	0.866
	<i>6.973</i>		<i>6.665</i>		<i>5.590</i>		<i>3.289</i>	
IGOs w/U.S.	-0.642	0.048	0.521	0.090	0.272	0.283	-0.159	0.288
	<i>0.310</i>		<i>0.296</i>		<i>0.248</i>		<i>0.146</i>	
Trade / GDP	12.254	0.721	-0.414	0.990	-3.177	0.908	-7.059	0.662
	<i>33.887</i>		<i>32.393</i>		<i>27.168</i>		<i>15.983</i>	
Albania	48.603	0.009	-24.328	0.153	-16.383	0.248	-8.039	0.334
	<i>17.311</i>		<i>16.547</i>		<i>13.878</i>		<i>8.164</i>	
constant	40.628	0.034	7.962	0.649	26.904	0.075	24.738	0.008
	<i>18.113</i>		<i>17.314</i>		<i>14.521</i>		<i>8.543</i>	
N	36		36		36		36	
R ²	0.5014		0.4067		0.2505		0.1658	
Prob > F	0.0161		0.0839		0.4893		0.8059	

2004

Conflict continued in Iraq in 2004, of course, in spite of the successful invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein from power. A *de facto* state of war continued in the country between insurgents using a range of guerilla tactics and U.S., Iraqi, and other forces. Another major event in 2004 was the March 11th Madrid train bombing by al Qaeda, killing hundreds.

Dates: 15 November 2004 - 5 January 2005 (PIPA)

Question: Please tell me if you think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world . . . the United States

	Mainly Positive	P>t	Mainly Negative	P>t	Neither	P>t	It Depends	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	-0.048 1.908	0.981	-0.472 1.633	0.779	0.143 0.791	0.861	0.300 0.504	0.567	0.135 0.972	0.893
TerrFatal	-20.016 15.479	0.228	21.429 13.251	0.140	-2.228 6.416	0.736	-2.228 4.091	0.599	2.115 7.884	0.795
Press freedom	-0.240 0.502	0.644	0.042 0.429	0.925	-0.022 0.208	0.920	0.217 0.133	0.136	0.015 0.255	0.953
% Muslim	7.404 24.735	0.771	-2.586 21.174	0.905	3.939 10.253	0.710	-0.833 6.538	0.901	-6.944 12.599	0.595
S w/U.S.	-31.591 28.086	0.290	26.058 24.043	0.307	-8.026 11.642	0.508	6.744 7.423	0.387	5.027 14.305	0.733
NATO	18.005 10.879	0.132	-9.542 9.313	0.332	-5.656 4.510	0.241	0.035 2.875	0.991	-2.838 5.541	0.621
IGOs w/U.S.	-1.355 0.627	0.059	0.906 0.537	0.126	0.483 0.260	0.096	-0.101 0.166	0.558	0.100 0.319	0.761
Trade / GDP	-1.405 42.175	0.974	10.426 36.103	0.779	-5.031 17.482	0.780	1.690 11.147	0.883	-5.426 21.482	0.806
constant	141.089 53.428	0.027	-19.972 45.737	0.673	-17.758 22.147	0.443	-2.018 14.122	0.890	-2.935 27.214	0.916
N	18		18		18		18		18	
R ²	0.6269		0.6043		0.3650		0.4832		0.1182	
Prob > F	0.1810		0.2184		0.7250		0.4638		0.9931	

The results for the only question we have for 2004, a general question about the U.S. role in the world, are quite consistent with our interpretation of the 2003 results. Global public opinion is strongly focused on the issues of unilateralism and international law in its assessment of U.S. foreign policy. The only significant variable in these equations is the IGO variable. Our interpretation is further supported by the revelations of serious prisoner abuse at the hand of the U.S. military in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. This news story emerged in April 2004 and played prominently throughout 2004 and 2005 around the world.

2005

While the robust effect of IGO memberships continues in 2005, other variables are also significant. Again, our models seem relatively good predictors of global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy. The question asked is the same as in 2004, dealing with the general U.S. influence in the world. We will highlight two issues and then move on to some concluding remarks.

First, the Regime Type variable achieves a prominent effect in these equations; higher levels of democracy contribute both to more positive assessments of the U.S. role and to fewer negative assessments. Some similar evidence emerged in 2002, but was not evident in the intervening years of higher conflict. It may indeed be

that publics in democracies tend to have a favorable positive bias towards U.S. foreign policy simply because of their socialized affinity for the U.S. political system, as imperfect as it may seem.

Dates: 17 October - December 14 2005 (PIPA)

Question: Please tell me if you think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world . . . the United States

	Mainly Positive	P>t	Mainly Negative	P>t	Neither	P>t	It Depends	P>t	DK	P>t
Regime Type	1.623 <i>0.905</i>	0.089	-2.274 <i>0.761</i>	0.008	0.123 <i>0.166</i>	0.468	-0.043 <i>0.284</i>	0.882	0.504 <i>0.491</i>	0.317
Press freedom	-0.156 <i>0.250</i>	0.541	-0.061 <i>0.210</i>	0.776	0.042 <i>0.046</i>	0.372	0.049 <i>0.079</i>	0.538	0.110 <i>0.136</i>	0.425
% Muslim	-11.688 <i>12.001</i>	0.342	33.002 <i>10.088</i>	0.004	-2.532 <i>2.196</i>	0.263	-4.676 <i>3.770</i>	0.230	-13.857 <i>6.508</i>	0.047
S w/U.S.	-34.040 <i>28.226</i>	0.243	40.205 <i>23.727</i>	0.107	-0.549 <i>5.165</i>	0.916	-11.975 <i>8.866</i>	0.193	5.192 <i>15.307</i>	0.738
NATO	18.214 <i>9.892</i>	0.081	-22.094 <i>8.315</i>	0.016	0.542 <i>1.810</i>	0.768	2.111 <i>3.107</i>	0.505	0.847 <i>5.364</i>	0.876
IGOs w/ U.S.	-1.499 <i>0.465</i>	0.004	2.151 <i>0.391</i>	0.000	-0.052 <i>0.085</i>	0.552	-0.113 <i>0.146</i>	0.449	-0.464 <i>0.252</i>	0.082
Trade/GDP	25.007 <i>38.835</i>	0.527	-37.026 <i>32.644</i>	0.271	4.510 <i>7.106</i>	0.533	4.182 <i>12.199</i>	0.735	4.179 <i>21.060</i>	0.845
constant	124.251 <i>26.147</i>	0.000	-69.156 <i>21.979</i>	0.005	3.347 <i>4.784</i>	0.493	18.141 <i>8.213</i>	0.040	23.965 <i>14.179</i>	0.107
N	27		27		27		27		27	
R ²	0.5230		0.7164		0.1070		0.3386		0.2952	
Prob > F	0.0276		0.0004		0.9329		0.2661		0.3820	

Second, we wish to call attention to the very weak support for our Influence model throughout the data presented here. There is only one piece of evidence in our results to support the expectation that, through a free press, the U.S. message is able to penetrate to foreign mass publics and “spin” their views of U.S. foreign policy. This occurs in the earlier 2003 Gallup survey, in which negative views of the effect of U.S. policy are significantly reduced. This very limited support may not be good news for our model, but we take heart in the apparent effect of press freedom in, at times, reducing ambiguity in opinion. Press freedom does have a negative and significant effect in two questions on “don’t know” or “no effect” type responses (2001 and 2002). And in 2001 press freedom also is associated with more negative news of the U.S. There is at least some room to hope that the institution of a free press does indeed supply those who enjoy it with better tools to evaluate important issues in international politics. And that the media-savvy U.S. leadership’s message can be countered by the diversity of views a free press allows.

Conclusions

We believe the most noteworthy implications of the results presented above are 1) the relatively robust support for our Interests and Socialization models across time, and 2) the new findings that joint IGO memberships, and to a lesser degree democracy, are relevant factors for international opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

We also note the consistency of our results with our previous research in the following ways. In most circumstances there is a general backlash against security cooperation with the U.S., but for NATO allies there does seem to be an affinity of interests which gives a positive perception of U.S. foreign policy. There is some evidence of positive effects for shared economic interests with the U.S. as well. And

Muslim populations are poorly disposed towards U.S. foreign policy, while states which have recent experience of deadly terror attacks tend to evince greater popular support for the U.S. And the exceptional experiences of Israel and Albania appear to lead to exceptionally positive assessments of U.S. policies as well.

Although we hope to introduce more sophisticated and direct measures of “influence” in future studies (such as high-level diplomatic visits), our research thus far indicates that greater adherence to international law and genuine reliance on multinational institutions are the surest means for the United States to consistently gain greater international support for its foreign policies. Of course, this is often argued by editorialists or critics of the George W. Bush administration, but we believe this paper presents new, systematic, and reliable evidence for such a contention.

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